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Abstract Several scholars have confirmed the role that the welfare state (WS) plays in
reducing poverty, promoting equality and ensuring the common wellbeing. One of the
limitations of the scholarship has been the conceptualization and operationalization of the
WS and poverty as one-dimensional variables. The purpose of this paper is to examine the
relationship between welfare state development, single-dimensions deprivations and
income inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean, before and after controlling for
demographic and cyclical factors. The WS is operationalized as a one-dimensional vari-
able, but also taking into account its multidimensional nature. Three individual depriva-
tions suffered by people on poverty and two income inequality indicators are used as
dependent variables. Three pooled time-series cross-section regression analyses with
panel-corrected standard errors models were carried out on 18 countries in the region
around 2000, 2005 and 2010. This paper shows that the development of social-welfare
programs and institutions seems to be an effective way of tackling individual deprivations
suffered by people on poverty in the region. On the other hand, the WS development didn’t
appear to be effective to reduce income inequality. The outcomes of welfare institutions
appear to be the pivotal dimension to reduce income inequality and income deprivations in
the region.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decades, several scholars have confirmed the role that the welfare state plays
in reducing poverty, promoting equality through redistributive policies and ensuring the
common wellbeing. Esping-Andersen (1990) and Mishra (1989) have highlighted the
objective of ensuring a basic minimum of entitled social protection to the population rather
than a public charity for a minority. Gough (1982) and Titmuss (1963) highlighted the role
of satisfying social risks and improving the well-being and living conditions of the pop-
ulation. Barr (2012: 12) goes further by considering poverty reduction as one of the top 10
goals of the welfare state and along with redistribution, as the two main goals of the
government.
There are multiple configurations of welfare policies and redistributive strategies to
achieve poverty and income inequality reduction. Institutionalized social security schemes
(retirement, disability, unemployment, etc.), cash transfer programs, universal basic
income, progressive taxation, universal education and health care, are just some of the
tools that may be used by the emerging welfare state1 in Latin America and the Caribbean
to reduce poverty and promote equality of opportunities.
‘‘Welfare effort (social spending as a percentage of GDP) has conventionally been the
preferred measure for comparisons in space and time of the level of development [be-
tween] welfare states’’ (Olaskoaga et al. 2013). Poverty is usually quantified using relative
or absolute income poverty lines and income inequality using the Gini Index. Taking this
into account, Caminada et al. (2012) and Kenworthy (1999), among other scholars, have
shown the explanatory power of the social spending on the reduction of income poverty.
Glomm and Kaganovich (2008) and Docquier and Paddison (2003) have confirmed the role
of social spending—specifically government spending on social security- on the reduction
of income inequality. It must however be asked if income poverty lines and social spending
are the ideal indicators to measure poverty and welfare state development. What about
non-monetary deprivations faced by individuals in poverty (i.e. deprivations that are not
caused by the lack of income, such as deprivations in the areas of education and health)?
Once the welfare state has been conceptualized and operationalized by its multidimen-
sional reality, does it exhibits a significant explanatory power with income inequality and
with individual deprivations (monetary and non-monetary) suffered by individuals on
poverty?
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between welfare state devel-
opment –as a one-dimensional and multidimensional variable-, single-dimensions depri-
vations and income inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean, before and after
controlling for demographic and cyclical factors. However, this paper does not assumes a
causality between the variables considered and does not seek to explain poverty, rather it
aims to demonstrate the relationship between variables across time (2000–2010) and space
(18 cases in the region).
Three tests were performed in order to address the explanatory power of the welfare
state development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Rather than operationalize the
welfare state only by its social spending dimension, this paper will take into account its
multidimensional nature by considering the coverage and outcomes as complementary
dimensions. First, time-series cross-section pooled data for 2000, 2005 and 2010 were
graphed in order to examine the relationship between the explanatory variable and the two
1 Huber and Stephens (2012) coined this term to describe the welfare state systems in Latin America and the
Caribbean.
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dependent variables: individual deprivations and income inequality. Second, a pooled time
series cross-section regression analysis was carried out before and after controlling for
demographic and cyclical factors that may affect the levels of individual deprivations and
income inequality, and measuring the explanatory variable using a one-dimensional and
multidimensional perspective. In the third technique, further pooled time series cross-
section regression analysis was carried out with the novelty of using the three dimensions
of the welfare state as explanatory variable. Demographic and cyclical factors were
incorporated also in this test. In addition, in the second model of the second and third test
data was analyzed using Beck and Katz (1995) method of ordinary least square with panel-
corrected standard errors models.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly presents the methodology
and results of the multidimensional welfare index, the indicator used to operationalize the
explanatory variable. The two dependent variables, poverty and income inequality, are also
addressed in the second section. Later on the paper presents the main results of the three
tests examining the relationship degree among variables and the explanatory power of the
welfare state development with the five selected individual deprivations and income
inequality indicators. The article finalize with a general conclusion.
2 Quantifying the Variables: Welfare State Development, Poverty
and Inequality
Before inquiring on the significance and the degree of relationship between poverty and
income inequality with the development of the welfare state in Latin America, it is nec-
essary to elaborate on the indicators to be used to operationalize the variables.
2.1 Explanatory Variable: Welfare State Development
According to Cruz-Martı´nez (2014), the concept ‘welfare state development’ refers to the
progress and institutionalization of welfare programs that address the social risks of the
population in order to assure a common well-being. The welfare state in Latin America and
the Caribbean could be best described as an emerging welfare state (Huber and Stephens
2012), welfare state in transition (Esping-Andersen 1996) or developmental welfare state
in the making (Riesco 2009), meaning that their welfare programs and institutions are not
yet as developed as their counterparts in Europe. Even though pioneers countries such as
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Brazil started to create their first welfare system back in the
1920–1930’s (Mesa-Lago 1994), they are still underdeveloped. Large part of the public
budget allocations are destined to remunerate public servants (Rezk 2006), there is an
unequal redistribution according to the class and status of the individuals (Huber and
Stephens, 2012; Huber 1996) and a relatively low tax burden –around 20 % GDP (CEPAL,
n/d)- hampers the economic viability of universal reforms.
There is an ongoing debate on the role of left-of centre governments in reducing income
poverty and income inequality in the region. Lustig and McLeod (2011) find that the so-
called ‘‘social democratic’’ governments of Chile and Brazil where effective in reducing
income poverty and income inequality, while the so-called ‘‘left populist’’ (e.g. Venezuela,
Bolivia, Ecuador) where not. However, Montecino (2011) finds out the exact opposite
results by using data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC). The latest Social Panorama publication from the ECLAC points out that income
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poverty has been reduced from 48.4 % in 1990 to 29.2 % in 2015. There was also an
income inequality reduction in the region –comparing the annual rate of change in the Gini
coefficient between 2002–2010 and 2010–2014. Uruguay, Argentina and Ecuador have
experienced the largest reductions in income inequality (all having left-of-centre govern-
ments), while Paraguay and Venezuela experienced an increase in income inequality.
Returning to the topic of the explanatory variable, we must begin to conceptualize the
welfare state as a multidimensional variable. Using just social spending indicators is
subject to criticism because of the over-riding importance given to this one dimension of
the welfare state [see for example Segura-Ubiergo (2007) and (Huber and Stephens 2012)].
Cruz-Martı´nez (2014) was able to construct a composite multidimensional indicator that
seeks to reflect the level of development among the emerging welfare state in Latin
America and the Caribbean during the 1970–2000’s. A similar methodology and indicators
was used in this paper to calculate the multidimensional welfare index in three times in the
period 2000–2010. Data availability allowed calculating the MWI around 2000, 2005 and
2010.
Using principal component analysis, eight indicators were reduced to three individual
welfare indexes. For PCA, the function pca(x, cor = TRUE) under the library (labdsv) was
used on R. Social spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), social
spending as a percentage of public spending and social spending per capita are the three
indicators used to build the social spending dimension index. The coverage dimension
index is formed by the following three indicators: percentage of population over 65 years
who receive a retirement pension, percentage of employees with retirement coverage, and
the number of hospital beds for every ten thousand inhabitants. Lastly, the proportion of
adults-in the age group of 25-65 years-with more than 13 years of formal education, and
the improbability of children under 5 years suffering infant mortality are the indicators that
represent the outcome dimension in the new index.2 Data for the 8 indicators used3 in this
article are provided in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
The first principal component (PC1) accounts for as much variation in the data as
possible (between 74.2 and 80.0 % for SSDI; between 75.0 and 79.5 % for CDI; between
59.1 and 68.3 % for ODI). Once normalized, the PC1 scores become the individual welfare
indexes for each of the 18 cases.4 These indexes represent three of the key dimensions of
the welfare state: spending, coverage of welfare programs and outcomes of the interven-
tions of welfare institutions. Through an arithmetic mean5 each individual index is
2 The outcomes dimension is included in the MWI because the outcomes of welfare institutions are
considered to be a vital dimension of the welfare state. Even though some scholars might consider infant
mortality rate and level of education as welfare outcomes, in this paper they are used to operationalize the
outcomes of welfare institutions (i.e. health and education institutions). The quality of health and education
institutions is considered relevant to reduce levels of individual deprivations and income inequality;
therefore, they are included in the multidimensional indicator.
3 The main reason behind the selection of these eight indicators is data availability. However, the justifi-
cation of the indicators selected to present different dimensions of the emerging welfare state in the region
has been addressed previously in Segura-Ubiergo (2007) –only the first 4- and in Cruz-Martı´nez (2014).
4 Thanks to the high correlation between the indicators in each of the three dimensions it was possible to
reduce the data to three individual indexes without loosing too much information. Two tests were necessary
on each data set to assess the statistical relevance of the PCA and to confirm that the correlation between
variables was high: the determinant of the correlation matrix and the Bartlett’s sphericity test.
5 Because the dimensions of individual welfare indexes were normalized (max = 1, min = 0) it was not
possible to use the geometric mean as in the new HDI method. One of the limitations of using an arithmetic
mean is the disadvantage of missing some information because of not being able to give more weight to
outliers.
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assigned the same weight in the construction of the multidimensional welfare index. See
the formula below:
MWIct ¼ SSDIct þ CDIct þ ODIctð Þ
3
;
where the multidimensional welfare index of each country (c) at a specific time (t) is
obtained by the arithmetic mean of the three dimensions’ indexes (SSDI, CDI and ODI) for
the country and time considered. The composite nature of this multidimensional welfare
index rendered comparative analysis of the welfare state development in 18 Latin
American and Caribbean countries possible. See Table 1 for the normalized PC1 scores
(maximum equals 1, and minimum equals 0) of the three dimensions’ indexes and mul-
tidimensional welfare index scores between 2000 and 2010.
2.2 Dependent Variables: Poverty and Income Inequality
According to Spicker (2002: 9–10) the definitions of poverty can be grouped into at least
eleven different clusters of meaning. Among them, there are definitions that focus on the
lack of material conditions (basic needs, deprivations, limited resources), on certain eco-
nomic circumstances (low standard of living, economic inequality, class), on the disad-
vantage due to social relationships (social exclusion, dependency on benefits, lack of basic
security) and on the normative side (material circumstances as morally unacceptable).
There are plenty of definitions of poverty, but the important question is how to measure it.
It is on this issue that the differences between supporters of the monetary and the capability
approach begin to become evident. The same happens between those who perceive poverty
as a relative or an absolute problem. What is to be poor? What deprivations and not
covered social risks make an individual poor? Is poverty a multidimensional variable as
well?
Advocates of the monetary approach, conceptualize poverty as income or consumption
below a set monetary value (minimum threshold), usually represented by a poverty line.
According to Ravallion (1992) poverty can be understood as a situation where certain
people do not achieve a minimum level of material well-being to the standard of a given
society. International organizations such as the World Bank, the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean use monetary thresholds as the main indicator to measure
poverty. However overcoming poverty is more than exceeding an income/consumption
poverty line. Individuals on poverty suffer from multiple deprivations,6 so the poverty rates
based on income poverty lines does not present the whole picture of poverty. Poverty
cannot be reduced to income poverty; an individual on income poverty suffers from one of
the multiple deprivations a poor individual have.
Monetarism follows a utilitarian criterion that considers the poverty line as a good
threshold to present the poverty of a population, since rational beings would always
maximize their resources to satisfy their needs and ensure their well-being. The main
problem with this hypothesis is the assumption that every individual act rationally at all
6 A group of scholars have developed the Individual Deprivation Measure (IDM) to operationalize a
multidimensional poverty index that is able to overcome one of the main limitations of poverty household
data: not measuring individual deprivations by not considering intra-household inequalities. The IDM takes
into account 15 areas of life to present individual deprivations suffered by people in poverty (e.g. food,
water, shelter, energy, education, health deprivations). See Wisor et al. (2015) and Bessell (2015).
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times. In addition monetarism presuppose as necessary, unrealistic assumptions in con-
temporary society such as equal prices for all consumers, availability of all consumer
goods, and absence of public goods. Such assumptions, inherent to the economic analysis,
based their theories on assumptions of a nonexistent and unrealistic society.
By contrast, in the capability approach poverty is conceptualized as the deprivation of
basic capabilities (Sen 1999; Nussbaum 2000). ‘‘The capability approach contains three
central concepts: functioning, capability and agency. A functioning is being or doing what
people value and have reason to value. A capability is a person’s freedom to enjoy various
functionings—to be or do things that contribute to their well-being. Agency is a person’s
ability to pursue and realize goals she values and has reason to value’’ (Deneulin and
Shahani 2009: 22). Individual deprivations hamper the process of transforming valuable
functionings of resources/goods into capabilities.
Even though the capability approach does not prescribe a specific list of main basic
capabilities, some scholars had argued in favor of such a list (See Clark 2005). Nussbaum
(2003) argues in favor of a list of ten basic central capabilities, which according to her have
an extensive cultural consensus. Nussbaum’s list of basic capabilities actually makes
reference to combined capabilities. Individuals with each of the central listed capabilities
must have a proper development of internal capabilities combined with the ability to
experience a favorable environment for the exercise of practical reasoning and other main
functionings. On the contrary, Sen (2004) argues that a general discussion with society is
needed in order to determine a list of basic capabilities. Only through public reasoning it
will be possible to decide what should be included and why. In addition, Sen believes that
it is practically impossible to list all the capabilities into a single list because of the
particular differences existing among the various societies around the world.
The capabilities approach consists of making explicit the high relevance of capabilities
and then move to recognize the enormous variability that exists in the supply of the
satisfactory goods of capabilities (Sen 1983). According to Robeyns (2011) the freedom to
achieve well-being should be understood in terms of the capabilities of people, i.e. of being
and doing what they value. In brief, according to the capability approach an individual that
is not able to do and be what they value is considered to be in poverty. Individual
deprivations—as the ones considered in this paper- are limitations to people’s functionings,
and thus a limitation of their capabilities.
Inequality is also a widely debated topic (Okulicz-Kozaryn 2015). According to the
OECD (2014: 110), ‘‘income inequality is an indicator of how material resources are
distributed across society’’. In a recent publication by the IMF, Dabla-Norris et al. (2015:
4) argued that ‘‘widening income inequality is the defining challenge of our time’’.
Widening the gap between the income perceived by the ‘rich’ and the ‘poor’ have negative
consequences in almost every aspect of human life, from life expectancy to violence and
illiteracy (Picket and Wilkinson 2010). Income inequality matters for the economy as it has
significant implications for GDP growth and macroeconomic stability, and it also matters
for the society as it hinders the equal opportunities to capabilities formation. This applies
for low-, middle- and high-income countries.
The Gini index is one of the most used indicators, although there are other measures of
income inequality such as the gap between the average income of the richest and the
poorest 10 % of the population. With the popular slogan coined by the Occupy Movement
‘We are the 99 %’, complementary inequality indicators are being used to exhibit the
wealth gap between the ‘super rich’ (1 %) and the rest of the world population (99 %). In
2015 OXFAM published a report stating that ‘‘in 2014, the richest 1 % of people in the
world owned 48 % of global wealth, leaving just 52 % to be shared between the other
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99 % of adults on the planet’’ (OXFAM 2015: 2). According to the organization, the
widening of wealth inequality continues, the world’s 62 richest individuals own the same
wealth as halve of the population and the top 1 % owns more wealth than the remaining
99 % (Hardoon et al. 2016).
According to Bossi et al. (2013: 1199), there are multiplicities of programs under the
welfare state in high-income industrialized countries that promotes redistribution and
provides social insurance programs for the population. ‘‘Some programs are designed
specifically to target inequalities between the rich and the poor, whereas others aim to cope
with variations in income over the life cycle’’. Emerging welfare states in Latin America
have experienced different trajectories and aren’t still as developed as the welfare states in
Europe (Navarro Ruvalcaba 2006; Cruz-Martı´nez 2015a), therefore it would be relevant to
examine the relationship between a three-dimensional welfare state development com-
posite variable and income inequality.
This paper uses 3 indicators of individual deprivations suffered by individuals on
poverty and 2 indicators of income inequality as explanatory variables. Three deprivations
experienced by individuals on poverty are operationalized as P1, P2 and P3. P1 refers to
income deprivation (ratio of population with an income below the cost of the national basic
basket of goods and services), P2 refers to undernourishment (ratio of population with food
inadequacy)7 and P3 refers to deprivation of hydration and hygiene facilities (ratio of
population without access to improved water sources or sanitation facilities). P1 is con-
sidered as an individual deprivation from the monetary approach, while P2 and P3 refer to
deprivations from the capability approach. Undernourishment (P2) is used to present
deprivation of health capabilities and deprivation of hygiene and hydration facilities (P3)
presents deprivations related to quality of life. Alkire and Santos (2010: 14) considers
malnutrition/undernourishment as a direct indicator of functionings, and showed that it
may have life-long effects in the cognitive and physical development of children, plus it
may produce negative externalities reflected as other health disorders. In addition, these
scholars considered deprivation of hydration and hygiene infrastructures as ‘‘means very
closely connected to the end (functioning) they are supposed to facilitate’’. Safe drinking
water satisfy the need of hydration and improved sanitation facilities promote hygiene
(2010: 16). In Latin America and the Caribbean there are still around 20 % of the popu-
lation with undernourishment and more than 14 % with deprivation of hydration and
hygiene facilities.
In addition, two indicators of income inequality are considered: the ratio of population
with an income below 50 % of the median income per capita (In1) and the Gini index8
(In2). The OECD and the European Union have constantly used this last indicator as a
relative poverty indicator, nevertheless this indicator measures income distribution rather
than deprivation or lacking of material goods. Because income inequality refers to the
7 According to the FAO (2013) ‘‘(…) it measures the percentage of the population that is at risk of not
covering the food requirements associated with normal physical activity, and therefore including also those
who, even though cannot be considered chronically undernourished, are likely being conditioned in their
economic activity by insufficient food’’. It is not an indicator of insufficient income to purchase food –as the
ECLAC poverty indicator- rather it represents the probability of selecting an undernourished individual in a
population. So it does not consider the cause (food availability or income) of the undernourishment but the
fact the individual is undernourished. An individual with food inadequacy will not be able to develop its
basic capabilities, in turn limiting the achievement of freedom and well-being.
8 It is a measure of the deviation of the distribution of income among individuals or households within a
country from a perfectly equal distribution. A value of 0 represents absolute equality, a value of 1 absolute
inequality (World Bank 2013).
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unequal distribution of income among different groups in a population, In2 is considered to
be an income inequality indicator. Data for the 5 indicators operationalizing the
explanatory variables are provided in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
3 Results
In order to examine the explanatory power of the welfare state development on the levels
of poverty and inequality in the region, three regression analyses were carried out.
3.1 Ordinary Least Square Regression Analysis
The first of three research techniques used in this paper was an ordinary least-squares
(OLS) regression with time-series cross-section data for 2000, 2005 and 2010. The formula
of the linear regression model is: Yct ¼ bXct þ A; where Y refers to poverty or income
inequality in country c and time period t, X refers to the multidimensional welfare index in
country c and time period t, A is the intercept, while b represent the regression coefficient.9
Five regressions were conducted, three with an indicator of individual deprivation and two
with an indicator of income inequality. This technique sought to answer the following
question. How strong is the relationship between the development of the welfare state and
the level of poverty and income inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean?
Figure 1 illustrates five graphs with the pooled data results of MWI and five depriva-
tions/inequality indicators for the 18 cases around 2000, 2005 and 2010. Looking at the
slope of the regression line we can confirm the negative relationship between poverty and
the MWI, as well as the null relationship between income inequality and the MWI (see the
horizontal regression line in In1 and In2). The negative signs of the regression coefficients
bð Þ and the significance level ratified what was stated above. In other words, countries with
higher combinations of social spending, coverage of welfare programs, and better out-
comes of welfare institutions appear to have lower levels of deprivations, but not neces-
sarily lower levels of income inequality.
However, we cannot effectively confirm or predict the changes that occur in poverty and
income inequality using a model with just one independent variable. Several variables
could impact poverty and income inequality. In order to solve this limitation, three controls
were incorporated in the next section into a pooled time series cross-section regression
analysis during the 2000–2010 period.
3.2 Pooled Time Series Cross-Section Regression Analysis: 2000–2010
The second of the three research techniques used was a pooled time series cross-section
regression analysis.10 Focusing only on the bivariate relationship between theMWI and each
9 One of the reviewers was worried about the problem of having welfare outcomes indicators as dependent
and explanatory variables. However this is not the case, but is relevant to be clear about what the outcome
dimension in the MWI is measuring. This third dimension is not measuring welfare outcomes, but outcomes
of welfare institutions (i.e. outcomes of health and education institutions). Therefore, there are not welfare
outcomes indicators in both side of the regression formula. There is a dimension in the MWI (explanatory
variable) that measures outcomes of welfare institutions and there are two indicators as dependent variables
(individual deprivations and income inequality) measuring two of the multiple welfare state objectives.
10 This analysis presents the degree of correlation and significance between variables, but do not pretend to
explain poverty/inequality levels and poverty/inequality structure in the region.
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of the five explanatory variables –as it was shown in the previous section- without controlling
for other relevant variables may produce biased results and conclusions. Therefore the three
indicators were included in a second model to control for demographic and cyclical effects.
Why include controls to the regressionmodel? Controls are includedmainly to avoid implicit
causality between variables with just a high correlation and to be sure that the relationship
between a variable X and Y is not fraudulent (Dı´ez Medrano 1992).
Following Caminada et al. (2012) and Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000) an analysis that
explains the level and structure of poverty ‘‘should ideally be based on a theory that would
have to address at least the following factors that could have an impact on the level of poverty
[as well as on income inequality]: differences in labor markets that affect earnings of indi-
vidual household members; demographic differences, such as the ageing of the population
and growth of single-parent households, which affect both family needs and labor market
decisions; and differences across countries in tax and transfers policies that not only affect
family income directly butmight also affect work and investment decisions’’ (2012: 117). For
this reason, demographic and cyclical factors were incorporated into the regression analysis
between the development of the welfare state, poverty and income inequality.
The first control variable used is the percentage of elderly population, which seeks to
control for changes in pensions over time/country. The second one is the unemployment
rate, which seeks to control for unemployment benefits. And the third control variable is
gross domestic product per capita (GDPpc), which seeks to present an approximation of the
wealth of countries. According to the academic literature (Caminada et al. 2012; Nolan and
Marx 2009; OECD 2008; Cantillon et al. 2003) these three appear to be the most relevant
control variables in a cross-country analysis.
Fig. 1 Relationship between the multidimensional welfare index scores, deprivation rates and inequality
rates around 2000, 2005 and 2010 in Latin America and the Caribbean. Note 18 countries from Latin
America and the Caribbean were included in the analysis (see Table 1). The MWI scores are standardized. A
score of 1 refer to a relatively more developed welfare state and 0 to a relatively less developed welfare
state. In the upper part of the Y-axis is mentioned the dependent variable used. P1, P2 and Gini indicators
from Argentina refer to the urban zone. Data around 2000, 2005 and 2010 for the MWI, individual
deprivations and income inequality indicator were used Source: CEPAL (n/d), FAO (2013), World Health
Organization (2015), UNICEF (2014), Inter-American Development Bank (2012), CEDLAS and World
Bank (2015)
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Table 2 shows the results of three regression models. The first model is a simple
ordinary least square bivariate analysis between the respective dependent variable (P1, P2,
P3, In1 or In2) and the MWI. The second model is a pooled time series cross-section
regression analysis including the three controls mentioned above. The third model is
similar to the previous one, with the only exception of using the social spending dimension
index to operationalize the welfare effort as a one-dimensional perspective. In the last two
models, the data were analyzed using Beck and Katz (1995) method of ordinary least
square with panel-corrected standard errors models.
The Bailey and Katz (2011) pcse function was used in the statistical software R to calculate
the panel-corrected standard error of themodel. According toBailey andKatz (2011: 1) ‘‘time-
series-cross-section data are characterized by having repeated observations over time on some
set of units, such as states (…) [and] often show non-spherical errors because of contempo-
raneous correlation across the units and unit level heteroskedasity’’. The non-spherical errors
produce incorrect standard errors from the ordinary least square regression. Following Beck
and Katz (1995) these errors are fixed through a ‘‘sandwich type estimator of the covariance
matrix of the estimated parameters, which they called panel-corrected standard errors’’.11
The formula of the pooled time series cross-section regression in model 2 is:
Ycp ¼ bX1ct þ aX2ct þ dX3ct þ eX4ct þ A; where Y refers to poverty or income inequality in
country c and time period t,X1 refers to themultidimensionalwelfare index (model 1 and 2) or
social spending dimension index (model 3) in country c and time period t, X2 the percentage
of the population over 65 years of age in country c and time period t, X3 the unemployment
rate in country c and time period t, X4 the GDP per capita in country c and time period t, A is
the intercept, while b, a, d, e represent the regression coefficients. The period considered in
this analysis is the first decade of the XXI century. There is no sufficient data to calculate the
MWI on a yearly basis; nevertheless the composite indicator was constructed for 3 years in
this period: around 2000, 2005 and 2010. The dependent and control variables also make
reference to these 3 years. Through this technique this paper sought to answer the following
question. Does the explanatory variable maintain its strength and explanatory power, after
incorporating controls in the regression model for the period 2000–2010?
Let’s briefly discussed the explanatory power and degree of significance of the model 2,
which includes controls for demographic and cyclical factors. As seen in Fig. 1 andmodel 1 of
Table 2, MWI coefficients (b) showed negative values with the five dependent variables (P1,
P2, P3, In1 and In2). Meanwhile, as shown inmodel 2, the inclusion of the three controls alters
the coefficient signs of the MWI from negative to positive in the models with inequality
indicators as dependent variables. The coefficient of determination results confirm that the
explanatory power of the welfare state development is relatively high for models with indi-
vidual deprivations suffered by population in poverty as dependent variables; however the
explanatory power is minor for models with income inequality as the dependent variable.
After taking a closer look at the results of the regression analysis in Table 2, it is
possible to confirm that indeed the MWI appears to have some significant explanatory
power with the individual deprivations (P1, P2 and P3) as well as with one of the two
indicators of income inequality (In1). Now, what if we controlled for demographic and
cyclical factors that may independently affect the levels of poverty and income inequality?
After including controls on the model, the MWI continues to exhibit explanatory powers
with poverty (p value\0.01 for P1 and P2; p value\0.05 for P3), but not with income
inequality (In1 or In2). However, it is important to mention that the explanatory power of
11 Beck and Katz (1995) show in their article the usefulness of OLS for TSCS data, over the feasible
generalized least square estimator suggested by Parks (1967) and popularized by Kmenta (1986).
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the MWI declined after including demographic and cyclic controls. After including the
controls, the regression coefficient of MWI halve in the model with P3 as dependent
variable, reduced by 43.5 % in the model with P1 and by 5.7 % in the model with P2.
What is the importance of knowing the explanatory powers of the MWI on poverty and
income inequality? Thanks to the analysis of the regression model and the respective
regression coefficients it is possible to estimate the effect that increasing the MWI a unit
would have on poverty and income inequality .12 Here I will focus on analyzing the slope of
the regression line. For example, according to the model for approximately each 0,113 unit
increase in the MWI we are going to expect a 3.42 % reduction14 of income deprivations, a
3 % reduction of undernourishment and a 1.43 % reduction of hydration and hygiene
facilities deprivation, after holding the three controls constant to their respective means.
Population over 65 years of age and the unemployment rate shows a statistically signif-
icant relationshipwith only one variable; the former with theGini coefficient (at the 0.05) and
the latter with undernourishment (at the 0.05). Gross domestic product per capita (GDPpc) is
the other variable in the model showing a statistically significant relationship with the 3
indicators of individual deprivation and the ratio of population below 50 % of the median
income per capita. However, after analyzing the regression coefficients we can confirm that
the significance of the GDPpc in the model is not accompanied by a substantial explanatory
power on poverty and income inequality. For example, after holding constant the MWI and
the other two controls, an increase of one dollar in the GDPpc of the region would approx-
imately reduce the incomedeprivation (P1) in 0.002 %, the level of undernourishment (P2) in
0.0009 %, the deprivation of hydration and hygiene facilities (P3) in 0.001 % and the ratio of
population with an income below 50 % of the median income per capita (In1) in 0.0004 %.
Although the explanatory powers of GDPpc on poverty and income inequality are
statistically significant, the change/estimated effect it would have on the dependent vari-
ables are not very relevant. It would be necessary to increase the GDPpc by about $ 1000
dollars to expect a 0.4 % reduction in the In1 and a 0.9 % reduction in the P2. And it would
be necessary to increase the GDPpc by $ 100 dollars to expect a 20 basis points change in
the P1 (-0.2 %) and a 10 basis points change in the P3 (-0.1 %). After visualizing the
regression line slopes in a graph, we can confirm that the MWI exhibited a steeper slopes
than the GDPpc with P1, P2, In1 and In2.
The main result after comparing the outcomes of model 2 (multidimensional explana-
tory variable) and model 3 (one-dimensional explanatory variable) is that after controlling
for demographic and cyclical factors, welfare effort (measured by the SSDI) and welfare
state development (measured by the MWI) have a strong and significant relationship with
the three individual deprivations considered, but not with income inequality. Therefore,
12 The regression coefficient analysis is ceteris paribus, which means that we are going to examine how
much a 1 unit change in X variable changes a Y variable after holding other X’s constant. In this case, the
paper examines the effect of 1 unit change in the MWI over poverty and inequality, after holding constant
the elderly population, the unemployment rates and the gross domestic product per capita.
13 How can a country increase the value of its MWI, so that it can have an effect on poverty and income
inequality? As I mention before, the MWI is a composite index of three individual indexes referring to the
three dimensions of the welfare state considered in this study. Each dimension arbitrarily contributes to one-
third of the MWI score. Meanwhile the weights of the initial 8 indicators that form the individual indexes
(SSDI, CDI, ODI) are assigned by the PCA. Looking at the loadings matrix (not shown here) we can have an
idea of the ‘importance’ or ‘explanatory power’ each initial indicators have within the individual indexes.
The component loadings show the correlation between the PC1 and the original indicators, so they tell us
how much of the variation in the initial indicator is explained by the PC1.
14 Here I don’t refer to elasticity but rather a simple analysis of the slope. How does a 1-unit change in the
MWI affect the poverty level (%).
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both –one-dimensional and multi-dimensional- welfare state variables did not appear to
have a significant relationship with income inequality during 2000–2010.15
A robustness test was performed using the Palma ratio –ratio of the income share of the
top 10 % to that of the bottom 40 %. The result (not shown here) was reconfirmed: either
using a multidimensional (MWI) or one-dimensional (social spending) indicator, there is
no significant relationship between the welfare state development and income inequality.
3.3 Pooled Time Series Cross-Section Regression Analysis: MWI Dimensions
As was mentioned above, the multidimensional welfare index used to operationalize the
explanatory variable is composed of three indexes. Each of these indexes refers to a dimension of
the welfare state: social spending dimension, coverage dimension of welfare programs and the
outcome dimension of welfare institutions. What if we consider each of the three dimensions as
explanatory variables in the regression analysis?Would the three dimensions exhibit a significant
a strong relationship with individual deprivations after controlling for demographic and cyclical
factors? Does any dimension display significant explanatory power with income inequality?
Which of the three dimensions exhibit greater explanatory power with poverty and income
inequality, before and after incorporating the controls for demographic and cyclical factors?
To provide answers to these questions further pooled time series cross-section regres-
sion analysis were performed with the three dimensions as explanatory variables. The
social spending dimension is operationalized by the social spending dimension index
(SSDI). The dimension ‘coverage of welfare programs’ is operationalized by the coverage
dimension index (CDI). Thirdly, the dimension ‘outcomes of welfare institution’ is
operationalized by the outcomes dimension index (ODI). As it was mentioned above, these
three indexes accounts for more than 74.2 % (SSDI), 75 % (CDI) and 59.1 % (ODI) of the
initial data variance. So they could be considered good summary indexes of the three
dimensions of the welfare state considered in the MWI.
By looking atTable 3,we can confirm that two regressionmodelswere conductedwith each
of the dependent variables (P1,P2, P3, In1, In2). The difference betweenmodel 1 andmodel 2 is
that the latter includes the three controls used before in the previous section. The formula of the
pooled time series cross-section regression in model 1 is: Ycp ¼ bX1ct þ aX2ct þ dX3ct þ A;
where Y refers to poverty or income inequality in country c and time period t, X1 refers to the
social spending dimension index in country c and time period t, X2 the coverage dimension
index in country c and time period t, X3 the outcome dimension index in country c and time
period t,A is the intercept, while b, a, d, represent the regression coefficients. The formula for
model 2 is Ycp ¼ bX1ct þ aX2ct þ dX3ct þ eX4ct þ cX5ct þ lX6ct þ A; where Y refers to
poverty or income inequality in country c and time period t, X1 refers to the social spending
dimension index in country c and time period t, X2 the coverage dimension index in country
c and time period t, X3 the outcome dimension index in country c and time period t, X4 the
percentage of the population over 65 years of age in country c and time period t, X5 the
unemployment rate in country c and time period t,X6 theGDPper capita in country c and time
period t, A is the intercept, while b, a, d, e, c and l represent the regression coefficients.
The results of the multiple regression analysis are shown in Table 3. Regression
coefficients of the SSDI and the ODI have negative values in both models and with the five
dependent variables (P1, P2, P3, In1 and In2), except on the model 2 with P1 as dependent
15 In a previous paper, the strong and significant relationship between social spending per capita and
individual deprivations was confirmed in a cross-country comparative analysis (21 cases) between 1990 and
2010 [See Cruz-Martı´nez (2015b)].
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variable. Meanwhile, the CDI regression coefficient is negative only in both models with
P1 as dependent variable, and in model 1 with P3 as the dependent variable. The positive
signs shown in some of the coefficients are odd, but what’s really important is the sig-
nificance and explanatory variable of the dimensions with poverty and inequality, before
and after controlling for demographic and cyclical effects.
Only one of the welfare state dimensions considered in this study appears to have some
significant explanatory power with the three indicators of poverty (P1, P2 and P3) as well as with
the two indicators of income inequality (In1, In2). The social spending dimension exhibits a
significant relationship only with undernourishment (p value\0.01) and with the deprivation of
hydration and hygiene facilities (p value\0.05). The coverage dimension exhibits a significant
relationship only with income deprivation (p value\0.01), undernourishment (p value\0.05)
and with income inequality measured by the Gini index (p value\0.05). Contrary to what was
expected, the significant relationship between the coverage of welfare programs, undernour-
ishment and Gini index is positive.16 Nevertheless, an OLS between the CDI and these two
dependent variables (not shown here) confirms the inverse relationship among variables.17 The
outcome of welfare institutions is then the only one who experienced a significant negative
relationship with the three individual deprivations and the two income inequality indicators.
Now, what if we controlled for demographic and cyclical factors? After including controls
on the model, the social spending dimension reduced the explanatory powers with
undernourishment by12 %and stop exhibiting a significant relationshipwith the deprivation of
hydration and hygiene facilities. The coverage dimension continues to exhibit a significant
relationship with income deprivation, undernourishment and income inequality (Gini index).
The explanatory powerwith income deprivation and undernourishmentwas reduced by 8.9 and
9.5 % respectively. On the other hand, the explanatory power of the coverage dimension with
the Gini index increased by 43.9 %. In addition, the coverage dimension gained significant
explanatory power with the other income inequality indicator (ratio of population with an
income below 50 %of themedian income per capita; p value\0.05). The outcomes dimension
continues to exhibit a significant relationship with income deprivation, undernourishment and
income inequality (Gini index), but lost the degree of significancewith the other two indicators
(P3 and In1). The explanatory power with income deprivation, undernourishment and income
inequality (Gini index) was reduced by 51.9, 20.5 and 22 % respectively.
What would be the estimate effect on poverty and income inequality after increasing the
three dimension individual index (SSDI, CDI, and ODI) by one unit? Here we will focus
again, on analyzing the slope of the regression line. According to the model 2 in Table 3
for approximately each 0.1 unit increase in the social spending dimension index we are
going to expect a 2.47 % reduction18 of undernourishment, after holding the three controls
16 History matters as Mesa-Lago (1994) would argue, therefore the legacy of the bismarckian model in
Latin American welfare programmes might shed some light over this puzzle. In the bismarckian model, the
coverage and benefits of social welfare programmes are closely linked to class and status. Rather than
creating unified welfare programmes, Latin American countries developed stratified programmes during the
XX century, where public servants, the military and organized workers were able to enjoy better quality of
coverage than the majority of the population (Barba Solano 2009, 2005). The main problem with this duality
in the coverage of welfare programmes, is that the large majority of the population worked in the agriculture
or the informal sector. This large majority was then relegated to stigmatized and scarce social assistance
with low replacement rates. Further analysis should examine if the specific structure of coverage in each
country (e.g. defined contribution or defined benefit, universal or stratified) might explain this puzzle.
17 Although not significant with the In2 as dependent variable.
18 Again, here I don’t refer to elasticity but rather a simple analysis of the slope. How does a 1-unit change
in the explanatory variables affect the poverty level (%), ceteris paribus.
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and the other two indexes constant. For each 0.1 unit increase in the coverage dimension
index we are going to expect a 2.54 % reduction of income deprivation, a 1.50 % increase
of undernourishment, a 0.64 % increase in the ratio of population with an income below
50 % of the median income per capita, and a 0.018 points increase in the Gini Index, after
holding the three controls and the other two indexes constant. At last, for each 0.1 unit
increase in the outcome dimension index we are going to expect a 1.35 % reduction of
income deprivation, a 1.78 % reduction of undernourishment, and a 0.012 points reduction
in the Gini Index, after holding the three controls and the other two indexes constant.
There are two unexpected results in the previous paragraph: the positive and significant
relationship between the coveragedimension andundernourishment, and between the coverage
dimension and the ratio of the populationwith an income below50 %of themedian incomeper
capita. How is it possible that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the coverage of welfare programs
exhibited a positive relationship with these two indicators? One hypothesis could be that social
protection programs considered in the CDI are associated to pension and health programs. If
coverage of targeted programs such as the conditional cash transfer programs would have been
considered, the relationship between the variables could have been different. According to a
Save the Children’s report, social protection can help address the malnutrition and
undernourishment by increasing the consumption of the families through cash transfers.
‘‘Social protection has apositive effect onhousehold aggregate consumption: a largeproportion
of cash transfers is spent on food, which has a clear impact on child nutrition’’ (Aston and Jones
2012: 4).19 Considering Bolsa Familia, Chile Solidario andOportunidades as examples, Soares
and Zepeda (2007), confirms the effectiveness of the conditional cash transfer programs
‘‘transferring income to the poorest, thus reducing inequality’’. Somaybe, it could be interesting
to consider in a future research the coverage of conditional cash transfer programs as a fourth
indicator in the coverage dimension index.Nevertheless, further analysis needs to be performed
regarding this incongruent significant relationship.
Population over 65 years of age and the unemployment rate shows a statistically sig-
nificant relationship with only one variable; the former with the Gini coefficient (at the
0.01) and the latter with income deprivation (at the 0.05). Gross domestic product per
capita (GDPpc) is the only control variable in the model showing a statistically significant
relationship with the 3 indicators of individual deprivation. However, after analyzing the
regression coefficients we can confirm that the significance of the GDPpc is again not
accompanied by a substantial explanatory power on poverty.
4 Conclusion
Poverty and inequality levels in Latin America and the Caribbean have steadily decline for
almost a decade and a half, and are at one of its lowest levels ever recorded. Nevertheless, there
are still millions of people in the region suffering from single or multiple deprivations and the
region continues to be the most unequal region of the world (Tsounta and Osueke 2014). So,
continuing reducing poverty and inequality continues to be an imperative in the region.
Poverty and inequality have many dimensions and determinants. But the results shown
in this paper suggest that the development of social-welfare programs and institutions
seems to be an effective way of tackling individual deprivations suffered by people on
poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean. On the other hand, the welfare state
19 See Table 1 on Aston and Jones (2012: 4) to understand how different types of social protection (social
transfers, social insurance, social welfare services for marginalized groups and social equity) may improve
child malnutrition.
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development didn’t appear to be effective to reduce income inequality. The first test
confirmed the negative relationship between the three individual deprivations (P1, P2, and
P3) and the MWI, as well as the null relationship between income inequality and the MWI.
The second test introduced controls to avoid biased results because of the bivariate analysis
in the first test. After including controls on the model, the welfare state variable continues
to exhibit explanatory powers with individual deprivations suffered by people on poverty
but not with income inequality. The use of a one-dimensional and multidimensional per-
spective to operationalize the welfare state variable displayed similar results. Population
over 65 years of age, and the unemployment rate shows a statistically significant rela-
tionship with only one variable, and the gross domestic product per capita exhibited a
statistically significant relationship with the 3 indicators of individual deprivation and the
ratio of population below 50 % of the median income per capita. Although the explanatory
power of GDPpc on poverty and income inequality is statistically significant, the estimated
effect it would have on the individual deprivations and income inequality are not very
relevant. Therefore, there is a low growth elasticity of poverty reduction (individual
deprivations) in Latin America during the first decade of the XXI century.
In the third test, the explanatory power of the three welfare state dimensions was
examined. The outcome of welfare institutions is the only welfare state dimension con-
sidered in this study that experienced a significant negative relationship with the three
individual deprivations and the two income inequality indicators. Therefore, improving the
outcomes of health and education institutions appears to be the most significant factors (of
those considered in the multidimensional welfare index) behind changes in individual
deprivations and income inequality. After including controls on the model, the social
spending dimension reduced its explanatory powers with the deprivation indicators, the
coverage dimension increased its explanatory power with the inequality indicators and the
outcomes dimension reduced its explanatory variables with the five indicators. The sig-
nificance of the GDPpc in this test is again not accompanied by a substantial explanatory
power on the individual deprivations suffered by people on poverty.
The welfare state as an institution tends to promote equality, but this was not the case
for Latin America and the Caribbean in the first decade of the XXI century. This doesn’t
mean that the institutionalization and development of the welfare state is not a solution for
income inequality, rather that the actual scope, programs, infrastructures, coverage and
social investments are not yet enough to promote significant income inequality reductions.
Although the state may have an obligation to reduce poverty and inequality, the welfare
state –measured by expenditure or by the MWI- is only one of the policy tools that may be
used. According to the results shown in this paper, out of the three dimensions, the
outcomes of welfare institutions should be the pivotal dimension to reduce income
inequality and income deprivations in the region.
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